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Joanna L. Grossman

Undue Burden: New York City Police Officer Denied Opportunity to Take Sergeant’s
Exam Because She Was Due to Give Birth the Same Day

It was a case of bad timing. Akema Thompson, an officer with the
New York City Police Department, was scheduled to take the sergeant’s exam on October 19, 2013. But she was
also scheduled to do something else that day—give birth to a baby. Since fetuses don’t take requests, Officer
Thompson requested an accommodation from the city that would have allowed her to take the exam on another
day in the event she needed to reschedule because of a conflict with childbirth or immediate recovery from it. Her
request was denied, despite the fact that promotional exams were routinely rescheduled for other reasons.
Officer Thompson has filed a charge of discrimination against the City of New York, alleging that the testing
accommodation policy, administered by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (“DCAS”), was
unlawful as applied to her. (DCAS administers testing for all civil service jobs in New York City, and, thus, the
NYPD was not responsible for the denial of Officer Thompson’s request.) She claims that the denial of her
request for an accommodation is invalid under federal, state, and local discrimination laws. While her case has
yet to be adjudicated at any level, her situation is all too common among pregnant working women. Employers
routinely deny costless accommodations that impose no hardship and that, in many cases, are made available to
other workers with circumstances or conditions that conflict with workplace obligations. Officer Thompson is
just the latest victim of a system that fails to see pregnancy as a condition worthy of even minor accommodation.
The consequences of this mindset for individual women, like Officer Thompson, and women in general is
devastating.
Thompson v. City of New York: The Charges
Officer Thompson is challenging the denial of a testing accommodation as a form of unlawful discrimination.
Represented by Legal Momentum, a non-profit group that advocates for the rights of women, Officer Thompson
filed a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She alleges that the denial
of her requested accommodation constitutes sex, pregnancy, and disability discrimination.
In her charge, she details the request she made and the various responses she received from DCAS. This agency
regulates and administers testing for all city jobs—not just those at the NYPD. Although the facts have not been
adjudicated by an agency or court, the charge filed appends copies of the written correspondence back and forth
between Officer Thompson and DCAS regarding her request. (Needless to say, the factual description in this
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/04/01/undue-burden
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column is based on Officer Thompson’s allegations. DCAS may deny these allegations or argue for a different
interpretation of them as the case proceeds through the EEOC process.)
In January 2013, Officer Thompson learned that the City had scheduled a Sergeant’s promotional exam for the
following October. Although this might seem like a routine event, these exams are scheduled only “as needed”
and can be spaced apart by several years. Officer Thompson immediately paid almost $800 to a test prep
company for a review course.
The next month, Officer Thompson became pregnant and informed the NYPD of her condition shortly thereafter.
Her due date was, as mentioned above, the exact same day as the exam.
In June 2013, Officer Thompson registered for the exam, paying an additional $83. Because of the conflict with
her due date, she contacted DCAS to request that she be allowed to take the exam on another day. She provided
medical documentation of her due date and the number of weeks she would need to recover medically from
childbirth. She requested the accommodation numerous times both in writing and over the phone. In one of these
communications, Officer Thompson mentioned that the NYPD had told her to request to take the exam on an
alternative testing day already set aside for those whose religious observance conflicted with the scheduled date.
At some point, Officer Thompson sought assistance from the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA), the
union for patrol officers in the NYPD, and the PBA requested an accommodation on her behalf.
The request for accommodation was flatly denied. She was told, in one piece of correspondence, that her “request
to postpone this test due to the possibility that you may give birth on, or shortly after the test date, is not
approvable.” In another e-mail, she was informed that City policy does allow the promotional exam to be
rescheduled, but only for conflicts due to (1) military duty, (2) DCAS error, (3) required court appearance (in any
type of proceeding); (4) physical disability incurred on the job or (5) the death of a close relative. She was also
told in other correspondence that tests could be rescheduled to accommodate religious observance.
Three days before her due date, Officer Thompson went into labor. She was hospitalized that day, October 16.
While in labor, she alleges she received a telephone call from a representative at DCAS, who reiterated that she
could not postpone the test because of childbirth, but offered her a cushion to sit on during the exam or two
additional hours to complete it.
Neither a cushion nor extra time was going to make it possible for Officer Thompson to sit for the sergeant’s
exam. She had an emergency C-section on October 16th and was not released from the hospital until October
20th, the day after the exam was given. And while other candidates may well have taken the October 2013 exam
at later dates due to “approvable” conflicts, Officer Thompson was denied the opportunity. It might be years
before the opportunity surfaces again.
Pregnancy Discrimination Law
Before the passage of the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978, pregnant women worked at the
whim of their employers, who had almost no restraint on their ability to exclude, mistreat, or fire them. The PDA
changed the landscape dramatically by guaranteeing pregnant workers two rights: (1) the right not to be subjected
to adverse treatment because of pregnancy; and (2) the right to be treated the same as non-pregnant workers who
are similar in their ability or inability to work. It is this second right at issue in a case like Thompson’s.
Employers have no absolute duty to accommodate pregnancy, but they cannot refuse to accommodate pregnancy
when offering accommodations for people with similar limitations.
Employees may also have rights under state or local pregnancy discrimination laws. The New York Human
Rights Law protects against pregnancy discrimination in a manner similar to the federal PDA. And, as of January
30, 2014, New York City offers pregnant workers more expansive protections under the Pregnant Workers
Fairness Act. The local PWFA (distinguished from a federal bill (http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/11/thepregnant-workers-fairness-act) by the same name, which has been introduced in Congress but made little progress
towards enactment) applies to employers with at least four employees. The law requires employers to provide
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/04/01/undue-burden
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“reasonable accommodation” necessitated by pregnancy or childbirth unless doing so would cause an “undue
hardship” on the employer. The types of accommodations contemplated by the law include light-duty
assignments (e.g., one without heavy lifting); changes to the work setting (e.g., to avoid toxins); more frequent
breaks to eat, drink, or use the bathroom.
In Officer Thompson’s case, she is challenging the City’s refusal to accommodate her pregnancy by allowing her
to postpone the sergeant’s promotional exam. Under the new PWFA in New York City, the City’s denial would
almost certainly be unlawful. Asking to postpone an exam that provides the opportunity for significant career
enhancement and is offered very infrequently is a reasonable request. It would be all but impossible for the City
to prove that postponement imposed an undue hardship given that it already offers the same accommodation to at
least five other groups of workers (noted above). All that Officer Thompson asked is that an existing
accommodation be extended to her—an accommodation that would be effectively costless to the City.
But this law did not take effect until January 30, 2014, several months after the test Officer Thompson missed
because of childbirth. Unless the law is applied retroactively, it will not help her. However, the New York City
Division of Human Rights, which implements anti-discrimination laws, has taken the position publicly that it
considered pregnancy a disability even before this law took effect. Moreover, she should have been granted the
accommodation under the federal and state laws in existence at the time of her request. And it is worth noting
that despite the change in city law, the DCAS testing accommodation policy remains in effect today.
As noted above, the PDA provides that employers who accommodate other forms of temporary disability must
also accommodate pregnancy. This clause was expressly designed to force changes to standard employer benefit
and leave policies, many of which excluded pregnancy altogether. It was designed to coerce employers out of the
mindset that pregnant workers were not worthy of the same accommodations or benefits, or that pregnancy did
not have cognizable effects on a woman’s ability to work uninterrupted. When the Supreme Court was first asked
to interpret this provision, it concluded that the provision imposed a floor on the treatment of pregnant workers,
but not a ceiling. In other words, employers could no longer exempt pregnant employees from otherwise
available benefits and accommodations. But they could take things in the other direction: employers could offer
accommodations for pregnancy and childbirth that they did not offer to other temporarily disabled employees.
This interpretation reflected Congress’s concern with the unfair treatment of pregnant workers that was
commonplace before enactment of the PDA.
By its express terms, DCAS policy is contrary to the PDA. DCAS admits that it provides such accommodations
to a wide variety of workers—including some with far less dire conflicts with the test than childbirth on the same
day—while withholding them from pregnant officers. For example, it allows candidates to postpone the
promotional exam if a close relative has died within a week of the exam date. While this is a humane rule that
correctly assumes officers need time to grieve and tend to the burial of a deceased relative, it is not clear that
these officers could not show up for the scheduled exam if no alternative were given.
But for Officer Thompson, both her predicted due date and her actual delivery date posed a direct and
insurmountable conflict with the exam. She could not be in two places at once—a hospital maternity ward and an
administrative testing room. The allegation that she was telephoned while in the hospital and offered a cushion to
sit on while she took the test, if proven, would be nothing short of mockery of her situation.
The law does not require DCAS to provide testing accommodations, but it does prohibit the agency from
withholding an otherwise available accommodation from pregnant candidates. And even if the policy didn’t
facially violate the PDA, it imposes a disparate impact on female officers, who are disproportionately likely to
have their careers hindered by this policy. Neutral policies that cause a disparate impact must be justified by
business necessity and, even then, cannot be followed if there is a less burdensome alternative. Given that the
promotional exam can be postponed for a host of other reasons, it will be impossible for the City to show that the
refusal of postponement to pregnant candidates is necessary to the operation of the business and/or that no less
burdensome approach could be taken.
Why the DCAS Rule Reflects Bad Policy
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/04/01/undue-burden
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Even if DCAS could successfully argue that its non-accommodation rule comports with federal and state
pregnancy discrimination law, why would it want to deny a minor and costless accommodation to a valuable
employee? The answer can only be in the undervaluing of female officers. Although this particular
accommodation did not relate to Officer Thompson’s ability to perform her existing job, it did prevent her from
seeking a promotion. Had she done well on the exam and earned a promotion, wouldn’t the City be better off by
advancing someone proven qualified for a higher position? And for many pregnant women, the refusal of minor
accommodation will affect their ability to carry out some aspects of an existing job. An employer’s refusal to
accommodate in such a case can mean that the employee is forced to quit or take unpaid leave. (And because
DCAS administers testing for all city jobs, its stingy accommodation policy cuts a wide swath.) While the most
significant consequences will be borne by the employee, suddenly deprived of income and perhaps health
insurance, the employer will suffer as well in the costs of rehiring, retraining, and, perhaps, not replacing with the
same quality employee.
Pregnant women generally are physically able to engage in paid work, just as they are physically able to carry out
other responsibilities in their lives. (Pregnant mothers don’t suddenly stop caring for other children because a
new one is on the way.) But there can be conflicts between the physical effects of pregnancy and the demands of
a job. Those conflicts can run the gamut—from restrictions on physical activity like lifting or climbing to
restrictions on exposure to danger to the need for a different schedule. Many women, especially those who labor
in low-wage jobs with inflexible working conditions or those who labor in traditionally male-dominated
occupations with serious physical demands and various kinds of hazards, do need some type of accommodation
during pregnancy in order to maximize the chances of a healthy delivery and continue working.
Just as the conflicts will vary by woman, by pregnancy, and by work environment, the accommodations needed
to keep a pregnant woman at work will vary as well. But often, as was true for Officer Thompson, the conflicts
can be alleviated with a minor and inexpensive, or even costless, accommodation. Yet, employers still deny
them. They should be taken to task for this as a matter of social policy, as well as a matter of law. Whether the
law requires them to or not, employers should take the steps necessary to integrate pregnant women into the
workforce—in all jobs, and at all levels. Pregnancy and childbirth are temporary, but a talented employee could
be there for a lifetime.
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